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I. INTRODUCTION: CONSERVATIVES AND HATE SPEECH-
THE RHETORIC OF RACE AND RIGHTS
In Babette's Feast,1 the French housekeeper for two dour
Protestant sisters living in a remote Danish village where life is hard
decides to mark her fourteenth year of working in this repressed
environment by preparing a huge feast. Using money she has just
won from the French lottery, she imports turtles, quail, and the finest
wines, and serves them at a long table to the sisters and their congre-
gation. But she has not counted on the experience's novelty: Until
now, the God-fearing folks gathered at her table have not touched a
drop of liquor or eaten anything other than dried fish and other plain
foods in their entire lives. During the dinner, they refuse to acknowl-
edge the delectable dishes they are eating, talking exclusively about
the weather, the crops, and God's will.
The response of some neoconservatives2 to the campus hate-
speech controversy reminds us in some ways of Babette's feast.
Lacking a ready category for what is taking place under their noses,
neoconservatives fail to notice what everyone else sees, or maintain
that it is really something else. As with the villagers, ideology plays
its part, as well. When something happens that conservative thought
does not predict, it is forthrightly denied, leading to some strange
alliances, as when Babette ends up playing to the returned General,
the one diner who allowed himself to appreciate and enjoy the meal.3
This Essay is about neoconservatives, the hate-speech contro-
versy, and the politics of denial. It is about mindset and the rhetori-
cal structures and strategies we choose, often unconsciously, to deal
with an uncomfortable reality and a changing legal environment. As
many, including the two of us, have written, the rhetorical and logical
structure of the hate-speech debate has been undergoing a slow but
1. Isak Dinesen, Babette's Feast (Vintage Books, 1988).
2. By the term, we mean those of centrist or moderately right-leaning persuasion who
disavow liberalism or radical politics in search of change. See generally Gary Dorrien, The
Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of Ideology (Temple U., 1993) (discussing
the rise of the new conservatives). In this Essay, we focus on four authors-Donald Lively,
Henry Louis Gates, Stephen Carter, and Dinesh D'Souza-who have written extensively about
the hate-speech controversy. Although we take issue with the general positions these authors
take, we intend the term '"neoconservative" in no disrespectful sense. Moreover, we write fully
aware that social and political positions are not fixed or unitary, and that a person who is
conservative or neoconservative on one issue may be progressive on another. See Richard
Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Arguments on Behalf of
the Nonwhite Underclass, 78 Georgetown L. J. 1929, 1931-45 (1990) (urging coalition with
conservatives).
3. See Delgado, 78 Georgetown L. J. at 1932, 1940-45, 1947-48 (noting the incipient
alliance between civil rights activists and progressive Republicans).
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inexorable shift.4 As First Amendment formalism, with its various
mechanistic doctrines, models, and "tests," has begun giving way to
First Amendment legal realism, both the moderate left and the mod-
erate right, who much preferred things the old way, have changed
their ground slightly. Realizing, perhaps, that mechanical jurispru-
dence and case law laid down in an earlier era will not hold the line
much longer, they have been urging that even if First Amendment
doctrine permits regulating hate speech, wisdom and good policy
counsel against it.5
In a recent article, we showed that the moderate left's response
(typified by that of the national ACLU) has taken the form of arguing
that hate-speech rules would injure the cause of their intended bene-
ficiaries, minorities. We critiqued four such paternalistic arguments,
which we termed the "pressure valve," "best friend," "reverse en-
forcement," and "talk back" arguments.6
In this Essay, we examine a group of arguments associated
with what we call the "toughlove" or neoconservative position:" (1)
that pressing for hate-speech regulation is a waste of time and re-
sources; 8 (2) that white society will never tolerate speech codes, so
that the effort to have them enacted is quixotic, symbolic, or disin-
genuous;9 (3) that racist expression is a useful bellwether that should
not be driven underground;O (4) that encouraging minorities to focus
on slights and insults is harmful because it causes them to see them-
selves as victims;" (5) that the campaign is classist, since it singles
out the transgressions of the blue-collar racist while leaving the more
genteel versions of the upper classes untouched; 2 and (6) that the
cure is worse than the disease, because it institutionalizes censorship,
and "two wrongs don't make a right."'3  What unites these argu-
4. See generally Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism is Giving Way to First
Amendment Legal Realism, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 169 (1994); Mari Matsuda, et al., Words
That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Westview,
1993); Richard Delgado and David Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of
Paternalistic Objections to Hate-Speech Regulation, 82 Cal. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 1994).
5. For the moderate left's response, see Delgado, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 169-70.
6. See generally Delgado and Yun, 82 Cal. L. Rev. (cited in note 4).
7. "Toughlove" is the title of a parents' group that sought to solve teenage problems with
unyielding rules and discipline. Ron Roberts applies the term to neoconservatives in an upcom-
ing book, Clarence Thomas and the Tough Love Crowd: Counterfeit Heroes & Unhappy Truths
(forthcoming N.Y.U., 1994).
8. See notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
9. See notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
10. See notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
11. See notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
12. See notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
13. See notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
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ments-which we call the "deflection," "quixotic," "bellwether,"
"victimization," "classist," and "two wrongs" arguments, respec-
tively-are two themes. The first is that struggling against hate
speech is a digression ("the real problem is . . ."), and the second is
that the effort reinforces the idea of oneself as a victim, rather than
an active agent in charge of one's destiny.
Part II of this Essay reviews the history of the campus hate-
speech controversy. Part III sets out and evaluates the six neoconser-
vative arguments against regulation. Part IV offers an explanation
for why neoconservatives take the positions they do on the hate-
speech controversy. We believe that the toughlove crowd opposes
hate-speech regulations because vituperative speech aimed at
minorities forces them to confront the intuition that slurs directed
against people of color are simply more serious than ones directed
against whites. This intuition, in turn, threatens a prime
conservative tenet, the level playing field. We explain why the First
Amendment version of that field-namely, the marketplace of
ideas-is not level but slanted against people of color, and why
talking back to the aggressor is rarely a satisfactory option for the
victim of hate speech.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HATE SPEECH CONTROVERSY
Beginning a few years ago, many colleges and universities
began noticing an upsurge of racist incidents taking place on their
campuses.14 Some took verbal forms, such as graffiti, anonymous
leaflets, defacement of posters, and insults hurled late at night at
black undergraduates walking home from the library.15 Others as-
sumed more serious guises, such as physical attacks or arson.16 At
some campuses, the number of African American and other minority
students began to drop as parents opted to send their sons and
daughters elsewhere. 17
Many campuses responded by adopting student conduct rules
that penalized racist threats or insults. Some were patterned after
tort doctrines such as intentional infliction of emotional distress,
14. For a brief history of some of these incidents, see Richard Delgado, Campus
Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 343, 349-58 (1991).
15. Id. at 349-50, 352-53, 357.
16. Id. at 349, 351, 353, 357.
17. Isabel Wilkerson, Racial Harassment Altering Blacks' Choices on Colleges, N.Y. Times
Al (May 9, 1990); Nancy Gibbs, Bigots in the Ivory Tower, Time 104 (May 7, 1990).
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others upon First Amendment exceptions such as group libel or fight-
ing words.18 The codes quickly came under attack by both the left and
the right. Conservatives found speech codes outrageous, deeming
them violations of the right of free speech and further evidence that
campuses were falling under the spell of radical multiculturalists and
politically correct thought police.19 The moderate left responded
almost equally strongly, but in slightly different terms. The national
ACLU declared its intention to challenge every such code, while at the
same time maintaining its commitment to racial justice.20 Two fed-
eral court decisions striking down hate-speech codes at the
Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin for overbreadth2' as well as
the "cross burning" case, R.AV. v. City of St. Paul,22 slowed the
movement somewhat. But a more recent decision affirming
sentencing enhancement for racially motivated crimes,23 coming on
the heels of two Canadian Supreme Court decisions upholding
national antipornography24 and hate-speech legislation,25 have
spurred a new round of activity. As we write, there is no sign that the
wave of campus racism is abating;26 campuses are taking advantage of
the changing judicial and scholarly climate to resume exploring ways
to confine and punish campus racism;27 and the forces, both on the left
and the right, who oppose hate-speech regulation are beginning to
hedge their bets. While they earlier argued that hate-speech rules
were flatly unconstitutional, now they are beginning to argue in the
alternative: Even if the rules are constitutional, they are a bad idea,
18. See Delgado and Yun, 82 Cal. L. Rev. (cited in note 4) (categorizing the types of rules
on college campuses).
19. See, for example, Chester E. Finn, Jr., The Campus: An Island of Repression in a Sea
of Freedom, Commentary 17 (Sept. 1989); Alan Charles Kors, It's Speech, Not Sex, the Dean
Bans Now, Wall St. J. A16 (Oct. 12, 1989); Thomas Sowell, Campuses Attempting to Mask Truth
by Closing Mouths, Rocky Mt. News B22 (April 16, 1990).
20. ACLU Policy Statement: Free Speech and Bias on College Campuses (Oct. 13, 1990),
reprinted in Nadine Strossen, Regulating Free Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
Duke L. J. 484, 571.
21. See generally Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989);
U.W.M. Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
22. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
23. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
24. R. v. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th (Can.) 449 (1992).
25. R. v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. (Can.) 697 (1990).
26. See Howard Ehrlich, et al., The Traumatic Impact of Ethnoviolence, in Laura Lederer
and Richard Delgado, eds., The Price We Pay: The Case Against Hate Speech and Pornography
(forthcoming Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1994).
27. For a discussion of this shift, see generally Delgado and Yun, 82 Cal. L. Rev. (cited in
note 4); Delgado, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 170-74 (cited in note 4).
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and campuses and other institutions should not enact them even if
they legally can do so.
2 8
III. THE TOUGHLOVE POSITION ON HATE SPEECH: SIX
NEOCONSERVATIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST REGULATION
As we have seen, the debate about campus hate-speech rules
has moved from the arena of doctrine to one of policy. The Supreme
Court's recent rulings presage such a shift, and the commentaries
indicate that First Amendment realism is about to replace formalism.
Conservatives, who generally do not like regulation, accordingly have
turned their attention to policy-based reasons why campuses should
abjure hate-speech regulation. In this Part, we analyze six such ar-
guments, showing their strengths and weaknesses, and the way they
are variants of a small number of basic themes.
A The Deflection (or Waste-of-Time) Argument
Many neoconservative writers who have taken a position
against regulation argue that mobilizing against hate speech is a
waste of precious time and resources. Donald Lively, for example,
writes that civil rights activists ought to have better things to do, and
that concentrating on hate-speech reform is myopic and calculated to
benefit only a small number of blacks and other minority persons.29
Instead of "picking relatively small fights of their own convenience, 30
racial reformers should be examining "the obstacles that truly im-
pede" racial progress, namely bad laws and too little money.31
Other toughlove writers echo Lively's conclusions. Dinesh
D'Souza writes that campus radicals espouse hate-speech regulation
because it is easier than studying hard and getting a first-rate educa-
tion.32 Stephen Carter also has little good to say about the hate-
speech crusade, describing it as a digression and a distraction.
33
Henry Louis Gates expresses perhaps the sharpest disdain for anti-
28. Donald E. Lively, Reformist Myopia and the Imperative of Progress: Lessons for the
Post-Brown Era, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 865, 888, 891-93 (1994).
29. Id. at 892.
30. Id. See also id. at 875, 880.
31. See id. at 892.
32. Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus 140-55,
230-42 (Free, 1991).




hate-speech activism, wondering why this ephemeral subject attracts
the attention of so many academics and thinkers when so much more
serious work remains to be done.14 In a cover story in the New
Republic reviewing Words That Wound, Gates, chair of the depart-
ment of African American studies at Harvard, writes that addressing
racist speech does lip service to civil rights without dealing with the
material reality of economic subordination.
3 5
But is it so clear that efforts to control hate speech are a waste
of time and resources, at least compared to other problems that the
campaigners could be addressing? What neoconservative writers may
fail to realize is that eliminating hate speech goes hand in hand with
reducing what they term "real racism." Certainly, being the victim of
hate speech is a less serious affront than being denied a job, a house,
or an education. It is, however, equally true that a society that
speaks and thinks of minorities derisively is fostering an environment
in which such discrimination will occur frequently. This is so for two
reasons. First, hate speech, in combination with an entire panoply of
media imagery, constructs and reinforces a picture of minorities in
the public mind.36 This picture or stereotype varies from era to era,
but is rarely positive: persons of color are happy and carefree,
lascivious, criminal, devious, treacherous, untrustworthy, immoral, of
lower intelligence than whites, and so on.3 7
This stereotype guides action, accounting for much misery in
the lives of persons of color. Examples include motorists who fail to
stop to aid a stranded black driver, police officers who hassle African-
American youths innocently walking or speaking to each other on the
streets, or landlords who act on hunches or unarticulated feelings in
renting an apartment to a white over an equally or more qualified
black or Mexican. Once the stage is set-once persons of color are
rendered one-down in the minds of hundreds of actors-the selection
of minorities as victims of what even the toughlove crowd would
recognize as real discrimination increases in frequency and severity.
It also acquires its capacity to sting. A white motorist who suffers an
34. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil Liberties Pose No Threat to Civil
Rights, New Republic 37, 43,47-49 (Sept. 22 & 27, 1993) (reviewing Matsuda, et al., Words That
Wound (cited in note 4)).
35. Id. at 42-43.
36. See generally Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Richard Delgado and Jean
Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy
Systemic Social Ills?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1258 (1992).
37. Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1261-77 (discussing media stereotypes of
minorities in different eras).
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epithet ("goddam college kid!") may be momentarily stunned. But the
epithet does not call upon an entire cultural legacy the way a racial
epithet does, nor deny the victim her status and personhood.38
A second reason why even neoconservatives ought to pause
before throwing their weight against hate-speech rules has to do with
the nature of latter-day racism.39 Most neoconservatives, like many
white people, think that acts of out-and-out discrimination are rare
today. The racism that remains is subtle, "institutional," or "latter-
day."40 It lies in the arena of unarticulated feelings, practices, and
patterns of behavior (like promotions policy) on the part of institu-
tions as well as individuals. A forthright focus on speech and lan-
guage may be one of the few means of addressing and curing this kind
of racism. Thought and language are inextricably connected.41 A
speaker who is asked to reconsider his or her use of language may
begin to reflect on the way he or she thinks about a subject. Words,
external manifestations of thought, supply a window into the uncon-
scious. Our choice of word, metaphor, or image gives signs of the
attitudes we have about a person or subject.42 No readier or more
effective tool than a focus on language exists to deal with subtle or
latter-day racism. Since neoconservatives are among the prime pro-
ponents of the notion that this form of racism is the only (or the main)
one that remains, they should think carefully before taking a stand in
opposition to measures that might make inroads into it. Of course,
speech codes would not reach every form of demeaning speech or
depiction. But a tool's unsuitability to redress every aspect of a prob-
lem is surely no reason for refusing to employ it where it is effective.
38. For a discusion of this stage-setting function and the efficacy of the background
considerations-the stories, narratives, and assumptions against which legal rules are applied
and construed-see generally Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1258; Richard Delgado,
Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813 (1992).
39. See Delgado, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 345-48 (cited in note 14); Delgado and Stefancic, 77
Cornell L. Rev. at 1261-88 (tracing this history and showing its implications for First
Amendment theory).
40. On this form of racism, see generally Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism:
Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 673 (1985); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 1016 (1988); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
41. On some of the connections between legal language and law in action, see generally
Symposium: Legal Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (1989) (containing articles by Milner Ball,
Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, Mar Matsuda, Steven Winter, and others).
42. See generally id.; Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1872
(1990) (addressing the role of metaphors in revealing and shaping our perceptions of a thing or
event). Consider also the way feminism's demand for sex-neutral language has changed the
way we think and speak of women.
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B. The Quixotic Argument
Neoconservatives also argue against hate-speech regulation on
the ground, similar to the deflection argument, that the effort is
quixotic or disingenuous. White people will never accede to such
rules. Proponents of hate-speech regulation surely must know this,
they reason, hence their objectives are probably symbolic, tactical, or
at any rate something other than what they say. Lively, for example,
writes that the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently rejected laws
regulating speech, finding them vague and overbroad.43  He also
writes that the campaign lacks vision and a sense of
"marketability"--it simply cannot be sold to the American people.44
Gates asks how hate-speech activists can possibly believe that
campus regulations, even if enacted, will prove effective. If campuses
are the seething arenas of racism that activists believe, how will
campus administrators and hearing officials provide
nondiscriminatory hearings on charges brought under the codes?45
Elsewhere he accuses the hate-speech activists of pressing their
claims for merely "symbolic" reasons, 46 while ignoring that the free-
speech side has a legitimate concern over symbolism, too. Carter is
less negative about the motivations of hate-speech reformers, but does
question whether their campaign is not "unwinnable. 47
But is the effort to curb hate speech doomed, quixotic, or disin-
genuous? It might be seen in this way if indeed the gains to be reaped
were potentially only slight. But, as we argued earlier, they are not:
The stakes are large, indeed our entire panoply of civil rights laws
and rules depends for its efficacy on controlling the background of
harmful depiction against which the rules and practices operate.48 In
a society where minorities are thought and spoken of respectfully, few
acts of out-and-out discrimination would take place. In one that
harries and demeans them at every turn, even a determined judiciary
will not be able to enforce equality and racial justice.49
43. Lively, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 875-81 (cited in note 28).
44. Id. at 869, 884, 895-96.
45. Gates, New Republic at 44 (cited in note 34).
46. Id. at 42, 48-49.
47. Carter, Affirmative Action Baby at 180-81 (cited in note 33).
48. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
49. See generally Symposium: Legal Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (cited in note 41)
(focusing on the relation between stories and narratives and the law's treatment of disempow-
ered groups throughout U.S. history); Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1275-88




Moreover, success is more possible than the toughlove crowd
would like to acknowledge. A host of Western industrialized democ-
racies have instituted laws against hate speech and hate crime, often
in the face of initial resistance. 50 Some, like Canada, Great Britain,
and Sweden, have traditions of respect for free speech and inquiry
rivaling ours.5' Determined advocacy might well accomplish the same
here. In recent years, many-perhaps several hundred-college cam-
puses have seen fit to institute student conduct codes penalizing face-
to-face insults of an ethnic or similar nature, many in order to ad-
vance interests that the campus straightforwardly identified as nec-
essary to its function, such as protecting diversity or providing an
environment conducive to education.5 2 Moreover, powerful actors like
government agencies, the writers' lobby, industries, and so on have
generally been quite successful at coining free speech "exceptions" to
suit their interest-libel, defamation, false advertising, copyright,
plagiarism, words of threat, and words of monopoly, just to name a
few.53 Each of these seems natural and justified, because time-
honored, and perhaps each is. But the magnitude of the interest
underlying these exceptions seems no less than that of a young black
undergraduate subject to hateful verbal abuse while walking late at
night on campus.54 New regulation is of course subject to searching
scrutiny in our laissez-faire age. But the history of free speech
doctrine, especially the landscape of "exceptions," shows that need
and policy have a way of being translated into law.65 The same may
well continue to happen with the hate-speech movement.
C. The Bellwether Argument
A further argument one hears from the anti-rule camp is that
hate speech should not be driven underground, but rather allowed to
remain out in the open. The racist who one does not know is far more
dangerous than the one who one does. Moreover, on a college campus,
50. Delgado, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 361-71 (cited in note 14).
51. Id.
52. See generally Howard J. Ehrlich, Campus Ethnoviolence. A Research Review
(National Inst. Against Prejudice and Violence, 1992); National Inst. Against Prejudice and
Violence, Community Response to Bias-Crimes and Ethnoviolent Incidents (1993) (discussing
campuses that have adopted speech codes); Delgado, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 343-58 & n.121.
53. Delgado, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 377-78.
54. Personal security and dignity, in other words, seem at least as important as the inter-
ests that support exceptions we currently recognize, most of which are only reputational or
pecuniary in nature.
55. See note 53 and accompanying text (describing the way powerful groups have suc-
ceeded in having exceptions recognized to protect their interests).
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incidents of overt racism or sexism can serve as useful spurs for dis-
cussion and institutional self-examination. Carter, for example,
writes that regulating racist speech will leave minorities no better off
than they are now, while screening out "hard truths about the way
many white people look at... us."56 D'Souza echoes this argument,
but with a reverse twist, when he points out that the hate-speech
crusaders are missing a valuable opportunity. When racist graffiti or
hateful fraternity parties proliferate, minorities should reflect on the
possibility that this may signal something basically wrong with af-
firmative action5s Instead of tinkering futilely with the outward
signs of malaise, we ought to deal directly with the problem itself.58
An editor of Southern California Law Review argues that antiracism
rules are tantamount to "[s]weeping the problem under the rug,"
whereas "[kleeping the problem in the public spotlight . . . enables
members [of the university community] to attack it when it sur-
faces."59
How should we see the bellwether argument? In one respect,
the argument does make a valid point. All other things being equal,
the racist who is known is less dangerous than the one who is not.
60
What the argument ignores is that there is a third alternative,
namely the racist who is cured, or at least deterred by rules, policies,
and official statements so as to no longer exhibit the behavior he or
she once did. Since most conservatives believe that rules and penal-
ties change conduct (indeed they are among the strongest proponents
of heavy penalties for crime), the possibility that campus guidelines
against hate speech and assault would decrease those behaviors ought
to be conceded.61 Of course, the conservative may argue that regula-
tion has costs of its own-something even the two of us would con-
cede-but this is a different argument from the bellwether one.
6 2
56. Carter, Affirmative Action Baby at 179 (cited in note 33).
57. D'Souza, Illiberal Education at 231-42 (cited in note 32) (suggesting that special pro-
grams and codes are necessary because affirmative action has failed or has been overly ambi-
tious).
58. Id. at 155, 231-42.
59. Vince Herron, Note, Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech Codes, and the
Pursuit of Truth, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 407, 424 (1994).
60. One may sometimes avoid, steel, or prepare oneself for the onslaught of the racist who
is known, but not, of course, the one who is unknown.
61. See Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 62, 252, 460-61, 467-72 (Addison Wesley,
1979) (suggesting that laws create and reinforce a common conscience and sense that racism
and prejudice are wrong).
62. The costs include: the physical and pecuniary burdens of holding hearings; the
bureaucratization of university life; and the possibility that false or exaggerated charges may be




A further neoconservative objection is that silencing the racist
through legislation might deprive the campus community of the "town
hall" opportunity it has to discuss and analyze issues of race when
incidents of racism come to light.63 But campuses could hold those
meetings and discussions anyway. The rules are not likely to
suppress hate speech entirely; even with them in place, there will
continue to be some number of incidents of racist speech and
behavior. The difference is that now there will be the possibility of
campus disciplinary hearings, which are even more likely to instigate
the "town hall" discussions the argument assumes are desirable.
Because the bellwether argument ignores that rules will have at least
some edifying effect and that there are other ways of having
campuswide discussions short of allowing racial confrontation to
flourish, the argument appears to deserve little weight.
D. The Victimization Argument: Do Hate Speech Rules Encourage
Passive, Dependent Behavior?
A fourth argument many neoconservative critics of hate-speech
regulations make is that prohibitions against verbal abuse are unwise
because they encourage minorities to see themselves as victims.
Instead of rushing to the authorities every time they hear something
that wounds their feelings, persons from minority groups ought to
learn to speak back or ignore the offending behavior. A system of
rules and complaints reinforces in their minds that they are weak and
in need of protection, that their lot in life is to be victimized rather
than to make use of those opportunities that are available to them.
Carter, for example, writes that anti-hate speech rules cater to "those
whose backgrounds of oppression make them especially sensitive to
the threatening nuances that lurk behind racist sentiment."'" Lively
warns that the rules reinforce a system of "supplication and self-
abasement";65 D'Souza that they distort and prevent interracial
friendships and encourage a "crybaby" attitude;66 Gates that they
reinforce a "therapeutic' mentality and an unhealthy preoccupation
with feelings. 67
63. See D'Souza, Illiberal Education at 153 (cited in note 32) (pointing out John Stuart
Mill's argument that even offensive speech serves the purpose of illustrating error); Carter,
Affirmative Action Baby at 175 (cited in note 33) (stating that "on a university campus, perhaps
more than any place else, unfettered debate is essential").
64. Carter, Affirmative Action Baby at 177.
65. Lively, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 898 (cited in note 28).
66. D'Souza, Illiberal Education at 128, 239 (cited in note 32).
67. Gates, New Republic at 46-48 (cited in note 34).
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Would putting into place hate-speech rules induce passivity
and a victim mentality among minority populations? This seems
unlikely, among other reasons because other alternatives will remain
as before. No African American or lesbian student is required to
make a complaint when targeted by vicious verbal abuse. He or she
can talk back or ignore it if he or she sees fit. Hate-speech rules sim-
ply provide an additional avenue of recourse to those who wish to take
advantage of them. Indeed, one could argue that filing a complaint
constitutes one way of taking charge of one's destiny: One is active,
instead of passively "lumping it" when verbal abuse strikes. It is
worth noting that we do not make the "victimization" charge in con-
nection with other offenses that we suffer, such as having a car stolen
or a house burglarized, nor do we encourage those victimized in this
fashion to "rise above it" or talk back to their victimizer. If we see
recourse differently in the two sets of situations it may be because we
secretly believe that a black who is called "nigger" by a group of
whites is in reality not a victim. If so, it would make sense to encour-
age him not to dwell on or sulk over the event. But this is different
from saying that filing a complaint deepens victimization; moreover,
many studies have shown it simply is untrue.68 Racist speech is the
harm. Filing a complaint is not. There is no empirical evidence that
filing a civil rights complaint causes otherwise innocuous behavior to
acquire the capacity to harm the complainant.
E. The "Classist" Argument
A further argument some neoconservatives make is that the
effort to limit hate-speech through enactment of campus rules is clas-
sist. The rules will end up punishing only what naive or blue-collar
students do and say. The more refined, indirect, but more devastat-
ing expressions of contempt of the more highly educatedclasses will
pass unpunished. Henry Louis Gates offers the following comparison:
(A) LeVon, if you find yourself struggling in your classes here, you should
realize it isn't your fault. It's simply that you're the beneficiary of a disruptive
policy of affirmative action that places underqualified, underprepared and
often undertalented black students in demanding educational environments
like this one. The policy's egalitarian aims may be well-intentioned, but given
the fact that aptitude tests place African Americans almost a full standard
deviation below the mean, even controlling for socioeconomic disparities, they
68. See generally Matsuda, et al., Words that Wound at 135-49 (cited in note 4) (detailing
the harms of racism and racist vilification); Ehrlich, et al., The Traumatic Impact of
Ethnoviolence (cited in note 26).
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are also profoundly misguided. The truth is, you probably don't belong here,
and your college experience will be a long downhill slide.
(B) Out of my face, jungle bunny.
69
Lively and D'Souza make versions of the same argument,
Lively urging that the codes reach only blue-collar racism and are
backed only by academic elites;70 D'Souza that the rules aim to enforce
a "social etiquette among students, while ignoring the higher-echelon
racism of meaningful glances and rolling of eyes of university higher-
ups."71
In one respect, the classist argument is plainly off target. Both
blue-collar and upper-class people will be prohibited from uttering
specified slurs and epithets. Many hate-speech codes penalize serious
face-to-face insults based on race, ethnicity, and a few other factors.7
2
Such rules would penalize the same harmful speech-for example,
"Nigger, go back to Africa; you don't belong at this univer-
sity"--whether spoken by the millionaire's son or the coal miner's
daughter. If, in fact, the prep school product is less likely to utter
words of this kind, or to utter only intellectualized versions like the
one in Gates' example7 this may be because he is less racist in a raw
sense. If, as many social scientists believe, prejudice tends to be in-
versely correlated with educational level and social position, the
wealthy and well educated may well violate hate-speech rules less
often than others.7 4 And, to return to Gates' example, there is a dif-
ference between his two illustrations, although it is not in the direc-
tion he seems to suggest. "Out of my face, jungle bunny" is a more
serious example of hate speech because it (1) is not open to argument
or a more-speech response; and (2) has overtones of a direct physical
threat. The other version, while deplorable, is unlikely to be coupled
with a physical threat, and is answerable by more speech.
69. Gates, New Republic at 45 (cited in note 34).
70. Lively, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 893-94 (cited in note 28).
71. D'Souza, Illiberal Education at 241 (cited in note 32).
72. On the wording of some of the more common variants of the codes, see generally
Delgado, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 344 & n.4, 358-59 n.121 (cited in note 14); Delgado and Yun, 82
Cal. L. Rev. (cited in note 4).
73. See text accompanying note 69.
74. For discussion of this "socioeconomic competition" theory of racism, see Delgado, 85




F. The "Two Wrongs"Argument
The "two wrongs" argument, which holds that hate speech may
be wrong but prohibition is not the way to deal with it, is one of the
relatively few arguments that both the moderate right and the mod-
erate left put forward, although they do so in slightly different forms
and for different reasons. The moderate left opposes hate speech
restrictions in part because although it detests racism it loves free
speech even more.75 Neoconservatives oppose regulation because it is
government (in most cases) that would be doing the regulating, and
especially because in the area of speech, governing to them is syn-
onymous with censorship. Gates, for example, writes that "[t]here is
also a practical reason to worry about the impoverishment of the
national discourse on free speech. If we keep losing the arguments,
then we may slowly lose the liberties that they were meant to de-
fend."76 He also warns that two wrongs don't make a right and la-
ments that our society and legal system have fallen away from Henry
Kalven's ideal of civil rights and civil liberties as perfectly compatible
goods for all. 7 Lively writes that history teaches that campaigns to
limit speech always end up backfiring against minorities, because free
speech is a vital civic good and even more essential for minorities
than others.78 Virtually all the authors of the moderate right persua-
sion (and some of the moderate left, as well) cite the fear of censorship
or governmental aggrandizement. If we allow an arm of the state to
decide what is harmful speech, soon little freedom will survive79
Our response to the two wrongs argument is elaborated in
greater detail in the next section, but one aspect of it is worth men-
tioning now. The term "censorship" is appropriately attached to regu-
lation by which the heavy hand of government falls on weaker, un-
popular private speakers, or else on political dissidents who are at-
tempting to criticize or change government itself.80 But with hate-
speech regulation, few of the concerns that underlie our aversion to
censorship are present. Hate-speakers are not criticizing government,
75. For the ACLU position, see Strossen, 1990 Duke L. J. at 571-73 (cited in note 20). See
generally Delgado and Yun, 82 Cal. L. Rev. (cited in note 4) (evaluating this position).
76. Gates, New Republic at 38 (cited in note 34).
77. Id. at 37-38.
78. Lively, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 879, 884, 897 (cited in note 28).
79. On the fear of governmental abuse and censorship, see Strossen, 1990 Duke L. J. at
489-92, 520-22, 533-38; Carter, Affirmative Action Baby at 176-78 (cited in note 33); Lively, 46
Vand. L. Rev. at 884; Gates, New Republic at 38 (cited in note 34).
80. On the fear of governmental censorship as animating much of First Amendment law,
see Zachariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 19-21 (Harvard U., 1941). See also New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
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but someone weaker than themselves. In prohibiting it, universities
are not attempting to insulate themselves from criticism; the political-
process concerns over governmental self-perpetuation are not present.
The speech being punished is far from the core of political expres-
sion-it carries few ideas at all except "I hate and reject your person-
hood."81 Indeed, hate speech silences the victim and drives him
away.8 2 Thus, when the government regulates hate speech, it en-
hances and adds to the potential social dialogue, rather than sub-
tracts from it.83
The next section explains how neoconservatives shrink from
differences such as these, even though they are relatively obvious, in
large part because they threaten a key element of the conservative
faith, the level playing field.
IV. WHAT UNDERLIES THE NEOCONSERVATIVE POSITION ON HATE
SPEECH: ANATHEMA, OR, THE FEAR THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT
PLAYING FIELD WILL TURN OUT NOT TO BE LEVEL
Why does the toughlove crowd embrace the six arguments that
we examined in the last section and found wanting? We believe the
reason has to do with the way hate speech casts doubt on a principal
tenet of the conservative faith: the level playing field. In First
Amendment theory, the name of that playing field is the
"marketplace" of ideas, in which messages and communications of all
sorts supposedly vie on equal terms to establish themselves, and out
of which, in theory, truth-the best idea of all-will emerge.84
The core difficulty which hate speech poses for the conserva-
tive mind is, simply, that there is no correlate-no analog-for hate
speech directed toward whites, no countering message which cancels
out the harm of "Nigger, you don't belong on this campus--go back to
Africa." Vituperation aimed at blacks wounds;85 there is nothing com-
81. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 Duke L. J. 431, 452 (positing that racist speech is not intended to invite discus-
sion, but is more like a slap in the face).
82. On the silencing argument, see id. at 452-56. For a general discussion of the topic, see
Cass Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795 (1993).
83. See Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 452, 456; Sunstein, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev, at 813-16,
830-33.
84. On the marketplace theory of the First Amendment, see Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a critique of that theory, see generally
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L. J. 1.
85. See generally Ehrlich, et al., The Traumatic Impact of Ethnoviolence (cited in note 26);
Delgado, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 136-49 (cited in note 36).
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parably damaging that whites have to undergo. The word "honky" is
more a badge of respect than a put down. "Cracker," although disre-
spectful, still implies power, as does "redneck." The fact is that terms
like "nigger," "spick," "faggot," and "kike" evoke and reinforce entire
cultural histories of oppression and subordination.86 They remind the
target that his or her group has always been and remains unequal in
status to the majority group. Even the most highly educated, profes-
sional class African American or Latino knows that he or she is vul-
nerable to the slur, the muttered expression, the fishy glance on
boarding the bus, knows that his degree, his accomplishments, his
well-tailored suit are no armor against mistreatment at the hands of
the least educated white.87
But not only is there no correlate, no hate speech aimed at
whites, there is no means by which persons of color and others can
respond effectively to this form of speech within the current para-
digm. Our culture has developed a host of narratives, mottoes, and
presuppositions that render it difficult for the minority victim to talk
back in individual cases, and to mobilize effectively against hate
speech in general. These include: feelings are minor; words only hurt
if you let them; rise above it; don't be so sensitive; don't be so
humorless; talk back-show some backbone. Stated or unstated nar-
ratives like these form part of the linguistic and narrative field on
which minority victims have to play in responding to taunts and epi-
thets, and of course limit the efficacy of any such response.
And when campus minorities mobilize for measures that would
curb hate speech in general, they encounter additional obstacles.
Although our system of free speech has carved out or tolerated dozens
of "exceptions" and special doctrines, opponents conveniently forget
this, treating the demand for even narrowly tailored anti-hate speech
rules as a shocking request calculated to endanger the entire edifice of
First Amendment protection 88
Hate speech, then, is individually wounding in a way that
finds no analog with respect to whites; there is no effective way for a
victim to speak back or counter it, even when it is physically safe to
do so; 89 and the most frequently targeted groups evoke little sympathy
86. On the way this happens, see Delgado, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 135-48; Delgado,
85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 383-84 (cited in note 14).
87. See generally Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class (Harper Collins, 1993); Carter,
Affirmative Action Baby (cited in note 33).
88. See notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing the role of these exceptions).
89. It often is not. Hate speech is often uttered in many-on-one situations where a
response is foolhardy. Indeed many reported cases of hate crimes apparently began this way: a
group of whites taunted a gay or black, who spoke back and was beaten or killed for his pains.
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from society or the legal system when they ask for protection. In
other settings, the combination of the three features just enumerated
would cause us to conclude that the playing field is not level, but
sharply slanted. Imagine, for example, an athletic competition in
which one side is denied a powerful weapon (say, the forward pass); in
which the other side is permitted to deploy this weapon freely, be-
cause the rules prevent the first from doing anything to counter it
when it is used (such as knocking down the ball); and changes in the
rules are not permitted because this is said to violate the charter that
established the game in the first place.
Surely, we would say that such a competition is unfair. Yet,
something like that characterizes the predicament of minority victims
of hate speech. Conservatives cannot allow themselves to see this,
however, since it goes against some of their most basic assumptions,
including free competition and merit. We believe this accounts for the
contortions and maneuverings among neoconservatives, including
many of color who ought to know better. But the problem of hate
speech will not go away by merely insisting on ideologically based
truths that "must be so," nor by responses that ought to work, much
less by blaming the victim or telling him that the problem is all in his
head. Hate speech renders campuses uncomfortable and threatening
to substantial numbers of students at vulnerable points in their
lives.90 It helps construct and maintain a social reality in which some
are constantly one-down in encounters that everyone agrees matter.91




Coming to grips with hate speech does pose serious problems
for a society committed both to equality and to individual freedom and
autonomy. But resorting to facile arguments like those discussed in
this Essay does little to advance the discussion. Neoconservatives
should allow themselves to see what everyone else sees-that hateful
slurs and invectives are a virulent form of inequality reinforce-
See generally Laderer and Delgado, eds., The Price We Pay (cited in note 26) (detailing and
documenting the connection between hate speech and incidents of hate-motivated crime).
90. See notes 14-17, 26 and accompanying text.
91. See notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
92. Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 452 (cited in note 81).
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ment-and join the serious search now beginning for cures to this
national disease.

